In January 1950 Gaitskell submitted a paper called "Control and Liberalisation" to the Economic Policy Committee, which he was sometimes invited to attend. He wrote that "On 'liberalisation' we have gone about far enough. But we have done it for political reasons – US and Europe". He was opposed to the convertibility of currencies and non-discrimination between trading partners, both policies which the USA favoured. Britain still preferred to encourage trade in pounds sterling within the Commonwealth, and Gaitskell wanted to preserve Britain's ability to avoid downturns like the US downturn of 1948–9, which Britain had largely escaped because of devaluation.
By the second half of 1950 the western powers were caught up in a major rearmament drive. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 at first threatened US loss of South Korea (which was seen as vital for the defence of Japan), and by the autumn threatened to escalate into a general war between the US and Communist China. There were also very real worries that the Soviets might invade western Europe (which was unarmed, with strong communist influence in many countries) and that the USA would not help Britain if she did not help herself. The crushing of democracy in Czechoslovakia had been as recent as 1948. In August 1950 the British defence budget was hiked from £2.3bn to £3.6bn (a total over a three-year period); at this stage it had appeared that the USA would be willing to help foot the bill.
In September 1950 inflationary pressure was worsened when the TUC voted to end the existing two-year wage freeze, although there was no wage explosion just yet. It was difficult for the Treasury to take tough measures given the government's small majority and the likelihood of another election soon.
Gaitskell thought balance of payments problems should be solved not by realignments of currencies but by asking surplus countries like the US and Belgium to inflate their economies (so they would import more). He was attacked for this by the US Treasury Secretary and Camille Gutt (former Belgian finance minister and now Managing Director of the IMF). Dell argues that Gaitskell did not realise that other countries had their own domestic problems. In September 1950, with Britain's balance of payments now in surplus, Gaitskell negotiated British membership of the European Payments Union, meaning that instead of bilateral clearing, European currencies were to be convertible against one another even if not against the US dollar. Previously dollars had been needed for trade within Europe. Until then Gaitskell had shared concerns that some countries might stay in permanent deficit and thus effectively use their neighbours for free borrowing, or conversely that Belgium's surplus would enable her to suck gold and dollars from Britain. The EPU lasted until sterling was made convertible in 1958.
Cripps, whose health was still failing, had notified Attlee of his intention to resign as Chancellor of the Exchequer on 26 April 1950. He attempted to resign in the summer but was dissuaded by Gaitskell and Plowden because of the outbreak of the Korean War. He instead went on a long holiday, leaving Gaitskell in charge.
It was now becoming clear that the US Congress was reluctant to help Britain meet the cost of rearmament. Gaitskell visited Washington in October 1950, his first visit there, just before becoming Chancellor. He warned that the terms of trade were shifting against Britain, and of the costs of rearmament.
In October 1950 Cripps finally resigned as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Dalton proposed Gaitskell for the vacancy. Sir Edward Bridges wanted Herbert Morrison, a political heavyweight; Morrison had been an early advocate of devaluation but did not regard himself as qualified. Gaitskell was appointed at the young age of 44, especially unusual as most of Attlee's Cabinet were in their sixties or older. He became the Chancellor with the shortest Parliamentary apprenticeship since Pitt the Younger in 1782. As Chancellor of the Exchequer he retained the same control over economic planning which Cripps had had. Both Cripps and Gaitskell insisted that Gaitskell be listed after Attlee, Bevin and Morrison in the official Cabinet pecking order.
The US Chiefs of Staff wanted an even greater increase in the British armaments budget to £6bn over three years, a plan backed by the British Chiefs of Staff and urged on Prime Minister Attlee on his visit to the US in Dec 1950. On his return from Washington Attlee told the House of Commons on 29 January 1951 that the defence budget was to be hiked to £4.7bn over the next three-year period, including a fourfold increase in munitions production. The defence budget was to increase from 8% to 14% of GNP, a proportion exceeded only by the USA amongst NATO members. At the peak 2.5m people, 11% of the workforce, would be engaged in defence work.
In December 1950, Gaitskell rejected the advice of Kim Cobbold (Governor of the Bank of England) and Hall that interest rates be raised, calling such a policy "completely antiquated".
A £300m surplus in the British balance of payments in 1950 turned into a £400m deficit in 1951, the most sudden reversal on record up until that time. This was caused partly by businesses switching to rearmament rather than generating exports. The other reason was a deterioration in the terms of trade: higher oil prices after the Iranian oil crisis caused an outflow of dollars, whilst prices of wool, tin and rubber fell so the rest of the sterling area was not earning so many dollars from exports. By the second half of 1951 the overseas sterling area was importing from North America at double the 1950 rate. By 1951 inflation was beginning to increase, the government budget surplus had disappeared, and in another sign of an overheating economy unemployment was down to 1945 levels. By the second half of 1951 Gaitskell was worried about the political effect of the higher cost of living, but the Financial Times and The Economist accused him of using higher prices to choke off consumption and free up resources for rearmament instead of consumer goods production.